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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-91-68

12 - FEB - 68

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Emergency Reinforcement of COMUSMACV ~~68~~

1. ~~(S)~~ Reference is made to your oral request of 9 February 1968 for three plans which would provide emergency reinforcement of COMUSMACV.

2. ~~(TS)~~ The three plans examined are:

a. Plan One, which is based upon prompt deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division and 6/9 Marine division/wing team, callup of some 120,000 Army and Marine Corps Reserves, and appropriate legislative action to permit extension of terms of service of active duty personnel and the recall of individual Reservists.

b. Plan Two, which would deploy as many Marine Corps battalions as are now available in CONUS, less one battalion in the Caribbean, the battalion in the Mediterranean, and the Guantanamo Defense Force. This plan would not be based upon a callup of Reservists or legislative action.

c. Plan Three, which would deploy the 82nd Airborne Division but would leave Marine Corps battalions in CONUS. This plan would likewise envisage no Reserve callup and no legislative action.

The guidelines for development of the plans and description of the airlift force mix options and movement capability are contained in Annex A. Plan One is examined in detail in Annex B, Plan Two in Annex C, and Plan Three in Annex D. Plans One and Three would require appropriate tactical air units for support of Army forces. All three plans require other support forces consistent with the duration of the augmentation.

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3. ~~(S)~~ Assessment of the Situation in Vietnam.

a. The VC/NVA forces have launched large-scale offensive operations throughout South Vietnam.

b. As of 11 February 1968, Headquarters, MACV, reports that attacks have taken place on 34 provincial towns, 64 district towns, and all of the autonomous cities.

c. The enemy has expressed his intention to continue offensive operations and to destroy the Government of Vietnam and its Armed Forces.

d. The first phase of his offensive has failed in that he does not have adequate control over any population center to install his Revolutionary Committees which he hoped to form into a coalition with the NLF.

e. He has lost between 30 and 40 thousand killed and captured, and we have seized over seven thousand weapons.

f. Reports indicate that he has committed the bulk of his VC main force and local force elements down to platoon level throughout the country, with the exception of six to eight battalions in the general area of Saigon.

g. Thus far, he has committed only 20 to 25 percent of his North Vietnamese forces. These were employed as gap fillers where VC strength was apparently not adequate to carry out his initial thrust on the cities and towns. Since November, he has increased his NVA battalions by about 25. The bulk of these and the bulk of the uncommitted NVA forces are in the I Corps area.

h. It is not clear whether the enemy will be able to recycle his attacks in a second phase. He has indicated his intention to do so during the period from 10 to 15 February.

i. South Vietnamese forces have suffered nearly two thousand killed, over seven thousand wounded, and an unknown number of absences. MACV suspects the desertion rate may be high. The average present for duty strength of RVN infantry battalions is 50 percent and Ranger Battalions, 43 percent. Five of nine airborne battalions are judged by MACV to be combat ineffective at this time.

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4. ~~(S)~~ MACV, RVNAF posture - COMUSMACV has expressed three major concerns:

a. The ability of the weakened RVNAF to cope with additional sustained enemy offensive operations.

b. Logistic support north of Danang, because of weather and sea conditions in the Northern I Corps area, enemy interdiction of Route 1, and the probability of intensified combat in that area.

c. The forces available to him are not adequate at the moment to permit him to pursue his own campaign plans and to resume offensive operations against a weakened enemy, considering the competing requirements of reacting to enemy initiatives, assisting in defending Government centers, and reinforcing weakened RVNAF units when necessary.

5. ~~(S)~~ It is not clear at this time whether the enemy will be able to mount and sustain a second series of major attacks throughout the country. It is equally unclear as to how well the Vietnamese Armed Forces would be able to stand up against such a series of attacks if they were to occur. In the face of these uncertainties, a more precise assessment of USMACV's additional force requirements, if any, must await further developments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not exclude the possibility that additional developments could make further deployments necessary.

6. ~~(S)~~ Measured against the foregoing, the only active combat-ready and readily deployable general purpose forces consist of the 82nd Airborne Division, one and one-third Marine division/wing teams, eight recalled Air National Guard tactical fighter squadrons, and nonforward-deployed Navy forces which constitute the rotation base for forward deployments. Thus, the residual CONUS-based active combat-ready ground forces that would result from the execution of each of the plans examined would be:

a. Plan One - 6/9 Marine Division/Wing Team.

b. Plan Two - One Airborne Division.

c. Plan Three - One and 3/9 Marine Division/Wing Team.

These Army and Marine Corps forces are at various levels of readiness, and a high percentage of personnel assigned are Vietnam returnees or personnel close to end of obligated active service.

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7. (TS) An examination was made to determine the feasibility of a more rapid acceleration in the deployment of the four infantry battalions now scheduled to deploy to Southeast Asia in March-April as a part of Program 5 forces. It was concluded that, while these units are currently undergoing an accelerated training program, they have not yet completed company-level training and should not be deployed earlier, except under the most critical circumstances.

8. (TS) In addition to examining the criticality of deployments to South Vietnam, we must look to our capacity to meet the possibility of widespread civil disorder in the United States in the months ahead. It appears that, whether or not deployments under any of these plans are directed, sufficient forces are still available for civil disorder control. These include National Guard forces deployed under State or Federal control, composite units brought together in each CONUS Army area, and some of the troops from the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions and 5th Infantry Division (Mech).

9. (TS) Against the possible increase in force requirements in Southeast Asia as well as those to respond to contingencies elsewhere in the world, our posture of readily available combat forces is seriously strained. Consequently, any decision to deploy emergency augmentation Active forces should be accompanied by the recall of at least an equivalent number from the Reserve components and an extension of terms of service for active duty personnel. In view of the time required to bring Reserve component forces to a combat-ready status - two months for the 4th Marine Division/Wing Team and three or more months for Army Reserve component divisions - and the limited number of Active combat forces available for deployment, it would be prudent to call to active duty certain additional Reserve component forces.

10. (TS) While there are variations in the problems of each of the Services, the rotation/training base of each is stretched and would be incapable of supporting, under existing criteria, substantially increased unit deployments. In addition, the capability of our uncommitted general purpose forces is further constrained by shortages of critical skilled specialists and shortages in mission-essential items of materiel and equipment, such as munitions, modern combat aircraft, helicopters, and communications/electronics and heavy engineer equipment.

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11. ~~(S)~~ Based on the foregoing assessment of the situation and problems facing COMUSMACV and the analysis of courses of action contained in the Annexes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude and recommend that:

a. A decision to deploy reinforcements to Vietnam be deferred at this time.

b. Measures be taken now to prepare the 82nd Airborne Division and 6/9 Marine division/wing team for possible deployment to Vietnam.

c. As a matter of prudence, call certain additional Reserve units to active duty now. Deployment of emergency reinforcements to Vietnam should not be made without concomitant callup of Reserves sufficient at least to replace those deployed and provide for the increased sustaining base requirements of all Services. In addition, bring selected Reserve force units to full strength and an increased state of combat readiness.

d. Legislation be sought now to (1) provide authority to call individual Reservists to active duty; (2) extend past 30 June 1968 the existing authority to call Reserve units to active duty; and (3) extend terms of service for active duty personnel.

e. Procurement and other supply actions be taken now to overcome shortages existing in certain critical items of materiel and equipment such as munitions, helicopters, and other combat aircraft.

12. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff observe that many additional problems pertaining to US military capabilities - although critical - are not treated in this paper. An updated assessment of US military posture worldwide and specific recommendations for required improvements will be reported to you in the near future.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

*Earle G. Wheeler*

EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

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## ANNEX A

PLAN GUIDELINES, AIRLIFT OPTIONS, AND  
MOVEMENT CAPABILITY

1. Guidelines for development of all three plans are:
  - a. The 82nd Airborne Division and Marine forces would be deployed by units, rather than drawing personnel from those units for individual personnel replacements.
  - b. Zero warning time is assumed, and deployments would commence as soon as possible after decision is made (date of decision is hereinafter referred to as X-day).
  - c. Personnel are considered eligible for deployment if they have more than 30 days remaining before expiration of term of service (ETS).
  - d. The personnel rotation policy is considered waived, and individuals would thereby be returned without regard to prior duty in short-tour areas.
  - e. Current tour lengths in Southeast Asia remain unchanged, except for minor adjustments due to use of replacement pipeline personnel.
  - f. All plans are to give consideration to dealing with widespread civil disorders in the United States.
  - g. Logistic aspects of the various courses of action are to be considered.
  - h. Our posture in Northeast Asia will be maintained.
2. A number of airlift force mix options were considered, but, by process of elimination, the choices were narrowed to seven. Each of the options listed below does not use capability of assorted aircraft which are the JCS-assured levels for other world-wide priorities. The characteristics of these mixes are:
  - a. Option I
    - (1) Maintains Southeast Asia airlift at current level.
    - (2) Utilizes: MAC at peacetime rate  
Current voluntary ANG and AFR  
Voluntary commercial contract

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b. Option II

- (1) Maintains Southeast Asia airlift at current level.
- (2) Utilizes: TAC at wartime rate  
MAC at wartime rate  
Current voluntary ANG and AFR  
Voluntary commercial contract

c. Option III

- (1) Maintains Southeast Asia airlift at current level.
- (2) Utilizes: TAC at wartime rate  
MAC at wartime rate  
Activate remainder of ANG and AFR<sup>1/</sup>  
Voluntary commercial contract

d. Option IV

- (1) Maintains Southeast Asia airlift of current level.
- (2) Utilizes: TAC at wartime rate  
MAC at wartime rate  
Activate remainder of ANG and AFR<sup>1/</sup>  
Activate CRAF I

e. Option V

- (1) Drawdown Southeast Asia airlift 35 percent below current levels.
- (2) Utilizes: TAC at wartime rate  
MAC at wartime rate  
Activate remainder of ANG and AFR<sup>1/</sup>  
Activate CRAF I

f. Option VI

- (1) Drawdown Southeast Asia airlift 70 percent below current levels.
- (2) Utilizes: TAC at wartime rate  
MAC at wartime rate  
Activate remainder of ANG and AFR<sup>1/</sup>  
Activate CRAF I

g. Option VII

- (1) Maintains Southeast Asia airlift at current level.
- (2) Utilizes: TAC at wartime rate  
MAC at wartime rate  
Activate remainder of ANG and AFR<sup>1/</sup>  
Activate CRAF III

<sup>1/</sup> Four-engine transports only.

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3. (TS) The closure times in days after execution order for the three plans and seven airlift force mix options are:

<u>Airlift</u>	<u>Plan One</u>	<u>Plan Two</u>	<u>Plan Three</u>	
Option I	59	31	34	4
Option II	33	22	16	5
Option III	30	21	15	6
Option IV	22	15	12	7
Option V	19	12	12	8
Option VI	19	12	12	9
Option VII	19	11	12	0

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ANNEX B

PLAN ONE

Deployment of the 82d Airborne Division and 6/9ths of a  
Marine Corps Division/Wing-Team to South Vietnam.

a. 82d Airborne Division

(1) Deployment concept. Without prior notice,  
elements of one brigade can commence movement in 24  
hours; the division itself 36-48 hours later. Deploy-  
ment would be conducted in four echelons: two brigade  
task forces followed by the division support element,  
then a brigade task force. The deployments can be  
continuous if aircraft are available.

(2) Major forces to be deployed from CONUS within  
one week:

82d Airborne Division Headquarters

Division Support Command

Three Airborne Brigades

Three Airborne Battalions each

Division Artillery

Three Field Artillery Battalions (105 mm)

One Cavalry Squadron

Total Deployment Strength 13,038

(3) Transportation Requirements. The transporta-  
tion requirements for the move of the 82d Airborne  
Division from Fort Bragg (and staging areas) are as  
follows:

Personnel (Authorized strength) 13,038

Short tons of cargo 11,585

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For movement options, see TAB A.

(4) Deployment Criteria and Current Major Shortages:

(a) Personnel. Division is currently short 3,074 personnel but can be filled with non-airborne personnel in 7-10 days using 30 days expiration of term of service (ETS) retainability criteria.

(b) Aviators. Division currently has shortage of 133 officer/warrant officer aviators, but these can be provided within 7-10 days after decision by using 30-days ETS retainability criteria. Replacing aviator shortages will cause severe personal hardship and curtail the provision of aviators to Korea.

(c) Aircraft. Current status:

	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On-Hand</u>	<u>Shortfall</u>
UH-1B/C	14	1	13*
UH-1D/H	35	12	23*
OH-13, OH-23, OH-6	48	0	48**

For further discussion, see TAB B, Logistics Considerations.

b. 6/9ths of a Marine Corps Division/Wing Team.

(1) Deployment Concept. 6/9ths of a Marine Corps division/wing team could be ready for deployment by air from the East and West Coasts of the United States to Vietnam in one week without utilizing Vietnam replacement drafts. If movement can be started two weeks after decision, and pipeline personnel are used, units will be drawn only from the West Coast, with East Coast assets retained in place. Combat elements on both coasts will be available for airlift commencing 24 hours after notification.

\* 36 aircraft to be provided from STRAF within 7 days which has 103 of 811 UH-1s authorized. Deployability criteria may have to be waived for some aircraft.

\*\* All OH-23s can be furnished in seven days from CONUS assets if deployability criteria is waived.

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(2) Major Marine Corps forces to be deployed from CONUS, without utilizing Vietnam replacement draft personnel, within one week:

(a) West Coast

Marine Division Headquarters  
One Regimental Landing Team  
Three Battalion Landing Teams\*  
One Direct Support Artillery Battalion  
One F-8 Squadron (Hawaii)  
One F-4 Squadron (Japan-Program 5)  
One A-4 Squadron (Japan-Program 5)

(b) East Coast

One Regimental Landing Team  
Three Battalion Landing Teams  
One Direct Support Artillery Battalion  
One Provisional Marine Air Group  
Two F-4 Squadrons  
Two A-4 Squadrons  
One UH-1E Squadron

Total Deployment Strength 14,960

(3) Transportation requirements will be as follows:

	<u>Without Pipeline</u>		<u>With Pipeline</u>		
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>	
<u>Hawaii</u>					
F-8 Sqdn	231	388	231	388	
BLT*	1575	1494	1575	1494	
<u>West Coast</u>					
Div Hq and RLT (-)	5161	3317			
Div Hq, RLT, RLT (-)			10575	7868	
<u>East Coast</u>					
Prov MAG	2579	6790	2579	6790	
RLT	5414	4531			
TOTAL:	14960	16540	14960	16540	

\* One BLT based in Hawaii commenced loading in amphibious shipping 8 Feb 68 to sail 10 Feb 68 for amphibious exercise in WESTPAC, and it is assumed it will proceed as planned.

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For further discussion, see TAB A, Strategic Mobility  
Capability.

(4) Current Major Personnel and Equipment Shortages.

(a) Personnel. Nonutilization of replacement pipeline personnel would require drawdowns on those units not deployed thereby reducing their readiness for other possible commitments. Shortfalls in remaining East Coast units would be about 5,000 personnel and in remaining West Coast units about 3,000 personnel. Except for combat capable pilots, no drawdowns would be required if replacement pipeline personnel were utilized.

(b) Equipment. There are no mission essential equipment shortages which cannot be resolved prior to deployment from current assets. Units will deploy with organizational equipment and five days of supplies, including ammunition (units equipped with M-14 rifles). For further discussion, see TAB B, Logistic Considerations.

c. Priority of Movement. Within the constraints of available airlift priority should be given to moving the entire 82d Airborne Division. This priority would avoid piecemeal commitment of both Army and Marine Corps combat elements and recognizes the fact that the 82d Airborne Division may be ready for deployment earlier.

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## TAB A TO ANNEX B

STRATEGIC MOVEMENT CAPABILITY

1. Purpose: The purpose of this TAB is to determine under varying lift options the requirements and capabilities to transport military forces and materiel from the United States to Southeast Asia.\*

2. Assumptions:

a. That lift capabilities have been determined on the present MAC lift posture and current lift requirements. (Special airlift mission (SARD) requirements are not considered.) Deviation from either of these factors will change the closing times and require additional analyses to determine appropriate closure times.

b. That increased MAC airlift requirements in the CINCPAC area since the Pueblo incident have created a temporary aerial port backlog.

c. That the movement of the designated emergency forces will be given priority of airlift over other existing scheduled air movements.

d. That unit closure time at destination does not take into consideration possible airfield saturation.

3. Movement Scheduling:

a. Using the options of airlift force mixes defined in paragraph 2 of Annex E, the 82d Airborne Division can be closed in SEA as follows:

	OPTIONS						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
<u>Plan One</u>							
Passengers 13,038	15	9	8	7	5	5	4
Bulk Cargo 11,585	34	16	15	12	12	12	12**

\* Proposed deployments of Air Force fighter and reconnaissance units are not included at this time.

\*\* Use of Option VII which includes CRAF III does not reduce closure time for cargo because no additional outsize airlift capability is gained.

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b. The 6/9 Marine division/wing team (-1 battalion and its equipment), can be closed in SEA in the number of days shown by Options as follows:

	OPTIONS						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Plan One							
Passengers 13,154	40	15	14	13	11	11	4
Bulk Cargo 14,658	39	18	17	15	13	13	13*

c. The total cumulative closure times for the combined airlift movement are:\*\*

	OPTIONS						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Plan One							
Passengers 26,192	59	29	27	21	14	13	6
Bulk Cargo 26,243	59	33	30	22	19	19	19

4. Discussion: CRAF III entails the declaration of a national transportation emergency, which would tend to have a considerable disruptive effect upon the civilian economy. This is not considered feasible at this time; therefore, Option VII is deleted from further consideration other than to indicate impressive amount of lift that becomes available. The possibility of any degree of drawdown on the current level of Southeast Asia airlift support, when evaluated against the existing dangerous environment prevailing within COMUSMACV's area of responsibility, becomes remote without a thorough, detailed analysis of existing supplies and shortages and consideration of losses incurred by unexpected enemy action. For all practical purposes, without further logistic analyses in depth, this would tend to discount Options V and VI. The difference between voluntary participation at the current

\* Use of Option VII which includes CRAF III does not reduce closure time for cargo because no additional outsize airlift capability is gained.

\*\* The total closure times do not equal the sum of the individual closure times due to the computer program and the manner in which the model schedules the available aircraft against the multiple requirements.

Tab A to  
Annex B

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level by ANG/AFR and the activation of the remaining units  
is approximately 28 million ton miles (current level of effort -  
11 million ton miles per month versus 39 million ton miles  
when activated). The current level of MAC commercial airlift  
buy engages approximately 60 percent of the airframes that  
would become available in the event CRAF I was invoked (Sec/  
Def declaration). Option III applies the significant addition  
of ton mile capability of the activated ANG/AFR to the task  
of supporting SEA at the current level. This releases lift  
resources which may be applied against the requirements  
addressed in this study.

5. Recommendations: It is recommended that Option III  
be implemented. However, in the event the recent trend of  
special assignment airlift continues and additional supply  
and resupply requirements generate, it may be prudent to  
activate Option IV.

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Tab A to  
Annex B

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TAB B TO ANNEX B

LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS (U)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this Tab is to consider the  
logistic aspects and factors incident to a deployment of the 82nd  
Airborne Division and 6/9th of a Marine Corps division/wing team,  
with subsequent callup of certain Reserve component units.

2. Assumptions

a. Additional funds required for the preparation, deployment,  
and sustaining support will be provided as required.

b. Increased authority for accelerated procurement to include  
delegation of authority to the Services to negotiate noncompeti-  
tive, cost reimbursable contracts and to provide necessary  
facilities and materiel will be provided.

3. Equipment Considerations for Deploying Forces.

a. Army

(1) The 82nd Airborne Division can deploy logistically as  
a combat effective C-1 unit. To achieve C-1 readiness,  
however, requires the fill of shortages in the division  
through withdrawal of equipment from other Active and  
Reserve component units located in CONUS. The division has  
the older PRC-6 squad and platoon radios and not the newer  
PRT-4/PRR-9 models with which the US Army units in Vietnam  
are equipped. Complete quantities of the newer models could  
not be made available until April. Significant withdrawal  
of aircraft from other CONUS STRAF units would be necessary  
to fill shortages in the 82nd Airborne Division. The  
following is the aircraft status of the division:

	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On-Hand</u>	<u>Shortfall</u>
UH-1B/C	14	1	13
UH-1D/H	35	12	23
OH-13, OH-23, OH-6	48	0	48

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(2) In order to complete the fill of UH-1s, 36 would have 1  
to be withdrawn from STRAF which has on hand 103 of 811 UH-1s 2  
authorized. The required UH-1s could be transferred from 3  
present CONUS locations and be on station at Fort Bragg 4  
within seven days after decision. Deployability criteria 5  
may have to be waived for some aircraft. 6

(3) There are 45 OH-23G helicopters in CONUS; 16 of these 7  
are in the training base. It is estimated that 10 percent 8  
of the total OH-23s would meet deployment criteria. All 9  
of the OH-23s could be furnished within seven days. 10

b. Marine Corps. There are no mission essential equipment 11  
shortages which cannot be resolved prior to deployment from 12  
current US Marine Corps assets. Units will deploy with organi- 13  
zational equipment and five days of supply, including ammu- 14  
nition. Units would be equipped with M-14 rifles. Additional 15  
combat support stock will be provided by a one-time surge in 16  
the established pipeline to SVN. 17

4. POL. The current petroleum inventory in I Corps is 560,000 18  
barrels. This represents a 20-day supply to the present I Corps 19  
force. The estimated requirement for the 82nd Airborne Division 20  
and 6/9ths of a Marine Corps division/wing team is 150,000 barrels/21  
month. The addition of this force to I Corps would reduce the 22  
days of supply in I Corps to 17 days. Resupply to the new I 23  
Corps force can be sustained by tankers from the Persian Gulf and 24  
Japan. In the longer run, an additional 150,000 barrels of 25  
petroleum storage should be constructed in I Corps. Estimated 26  
cost of construction is \$1,500,000. 27

#### 5. Ammunition 28

a. Air Munitions. CINCPAC expended approximately 90,000 29  
tons of air munitions during January, which includes support of 30  
800 B-52 sorties. This would be increased by approximately 31  
12,000 tons commencing in February, with the increase in SAC 32

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B-52 sorties from 800 to 1,200 sorties per month. Present production is approximately 101,000 tons per month with a production base expansion capability to over 127,000 tons per month. Current on-hand CINCPAC Southeast Asia assets exceed stockage objectives which will allow for absorption of additive aircraft without seriously degrading present support capability while adjustments are being made to the production base as may be required. The aircraft augmentation considered by the plan is equivalent to 6 squadrons of tactical aircraft which would increase requirements by approximately 7,200 tons a month. This is capable of being supported by moderate increase of present production.

b. Ground Munitions

(1) During the 4-month period, September-December 1967, the average tonnage expended in SEA for 40 controlled items (about 90 to 95 percent of bulk monthly requirement) has been 102,000 short tons (10,000 S/T ARVN, 92,000 S/T USARV and III MAF). Monthly production of ground munitions is now reaching approximately 113,000 tons a month. From the total monthly production, approximately 10,000 tons per month are committed to essential worldwide training and a limited amount of MAP sales. This leaves some 103,000 tons for support of Southeast Asia.

(2) To support consumption generated by the Plan One deployment of one airborne division and 6/9ths Marine division will require an additional 12,000 S/T per month, an increase of 12-1/2 percent.

(3) An increase in requirements of this magnitude cannot be supported across the board from current production. A significant item basic to infantry battalion maneuver is the 105MM HE projectile. Current production of this item is at a maximum level within existing facilities. The

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procurement leadtime to acquire new production assets  
varies by item, generally from 6 to 18 months.

(4) The deployments considered in Plan One can be  
supported under the following conditions:

(a) A drawdown on previously protected CONUS stocks  
will be necessary during procurement leadtime for new  
production.

(b) The gross requirement of 12,000 S/T would  
initially draw down in-country operating and safety  
levels until other assets could be made available. (A  
consequence of reduced stock availability could have an  
impact on the rate of combat operations.)

(c) Certain PACOM reserve stocks have been excluded  
from the above considerations because of requirements  
associated with the Korean situation. (In view of the  
political and military conditions in Korea, recommenda-  
tions for minimal corrective actions have been forwarded  
to the Secretary of Defense to seek authorization to  
reposition ammunition in the CINCPAC area for Korea.  
If immediate action were authorized to reposition  
sufficient ammunition to balance the ROK war reserves to  
the authorized 30-combat day level for the support of  
18 ROK divisions, it would involve repositioning approxi-  
mately 33,000 S/T of ammunition. This would constrain  
any major drawdown on the PACOM reserves to offset the  
munitions requirements of additional forces being con-  
sidered for deployment to Southeast Asia.)

(d) The drawdown on CONUS reserves and training  
allocations would continue for the period of time  
required to fill the pipeline from new production to meet  
monthly consumption.

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Tab B to  
Annex B

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(5) In order to support increased consumption requirements, expeditious actions must be taken to adjust production schedules and facilities to provide for these added requirements which under Plan One translate into the following (less facilities cost):

(a) 30-day consumption 12,000 S/T \$18 million.  
(Note subparagraph 5b(2) above)

(b) 150-day pipeline 60,000 S/T \$90 million.

6. Construction

a. Deployment of forces in Plan One can be made without constraint if executed on an expeditionary (field) basis utilizing TO&E outfitting.

b. Impact on existing facilities (without expansion) of sustained support of expeditionary deployment will vary in degree, subject to the distribution of the units in the ICTZ. The major constraints will be the port and LOC capacity at Dong Ha (Cua Viet), Hue/Phu Bai (Tam My), and Duc Pho (Xa Huyuh), and to a lesser degree at Chu Lai.

c. Continued deployment of the forces in Plan One would require follow-on augmentation of existing facilities, which would require increased civilian contractor construction or deployment of additional Naval Mobile Construction Battalions or Army Engineer Battalions.

d. The plan can be supported by initial deployment on an expeditionary basis, followed by construction of support facilities according to priority of need.

7. Reserve Forces Callup

a. Materiel availability for equipping and sustaining the combat capability of the increased active force levels appears to be the most significant pacing factor in achieving the desired force posture within a reasonable period of time. Relaxation of present administrative controls to expedite production, such as delegation to the Services to negotiate non-competitive contracts, utilizing cost reimbursable forms of

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contracts, or application of additional monies for overtime, could alleviate specific shortfalls in some areas. Present materiel requirements, without considering the increased materiel consumption that will result from the additional deployments and the partial callup of the Reserve forces, are not being met currently for naval combatant and auxiliary ships, helicopters, tracked combat vehicles, tactical wheeled vehicles, (area communications) equipment, and heavy engineer equipment.

b. If present administrative controls were relaxed to expedite production, such as delegation to the Services to negotiate noncompetitive contracts, utilizing cost reimbursable forms of contracts, and provision of additional monies for overtime, the Army estimates the following:

(1) Helicopters. No significant increase in COBRA and HU 1H production can be expected for 18 months. CHINOOK and LOH production could be increased in 9-12 months.

(2) Tracked Combat Vehicles. No increase in M60A1 tank production can be expected for 12-13 months. No increased production in the M-113 family of vehicles can be expected for approximately nine months, even with a DX rating on Detroit Diesel engines.

(3) Tactical Wheeled Vehicles. Production can be increased, in approximately six months.

(4) Tactical Communications. PRT-4/PRR-9, PRC-25, and VRC-12 radios, counting substitutes, are currently in adequate supply and production could be increased in six-eight months. No increase in production of area communication systems equipment can be expected for approximately 12 months.

(5) Engineer Equipment. Production of major engineer end items could be increased in approximately 8-10 months.

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The production of generators could not be increased for  
approximately 12 months due to engine limitations.

c. Assuming that REFORGER will be executed, the stationing  
of a mobilized force of 90,000 Army troops can be accomplished  
by making maximum use of active installations and activating  
inactive installations having a capacity for approximately  
25,000 troops. It is estimated that approximately \$47 million  
would be required to open inactive installations and to prepare  
facilities at active installations.

d. Army Reserve component assets were found adequate to meet  
more than 50 percent of the TOE equipment requirements of a  
90,000 Reserve force. Fifteen percent of this TOE equipment  
consists of major items with shortages. Analysis of a sampling  
of this latter group shows that approximately 75 percent of  
these item shortages can be filled during this fiscal year.  
The drawdown on Reserve component assets to equip this force  
will result in reduced training capability and readiness for  
the units not mobilized.

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ANNEX C

PLAN TWO

Maximum Marine Corps Deployments to Vietnam

12/9 Marine Corps Divisions

(1) Deployment concept. Elements of two CONUS Marine divisions, the 2nd and 5th Divisions, consisting of 12 battalions could be air transported to Vietnam. In order to deploy this number of battalions, two weeks preparation would be required. This deployment would deplete Marine Corps assets except for three battalions -- one afloat in the Mediterranean, one afloat in the Caribbean, and one ashore at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Hawaii battalion has already deployed by amphibious shipping; two CONUS battalions will be available for deployment commencing 24 hours after notification, three more battalions will be available for deployment in one week, and the remaining six battalions by the end of the second week.

(2) Transportation requirements for these forces will be:

	<u>No. Units</u>	<u>Personnel</u> (Per Unit)	<u>Short Tons</u> (Per Unit)
Hawaii			
Bn (Reinf)	1*	1575	1494
West Coast			
Bn (Reinf)	5	2091	1495
Regt Hq	2	222	66
Div Hq	1	1424	216
East Coast			
Bn (Reinf)	6	2050	1495
Regt Hq	2	222	66
Div Hq	1	1475	193
Total (All Units)	12 Bns	28117	18617

\* One BLT based in Hawaii commenced loading in amphibious shipping 8 Feb 68 to sail 10 Feb for amphibious exercise in WESTPAC, and it is assumed it will proceed as planned.

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For movement options, see Tab A, Strategic Mobility Capability.

(3) Deployment Criteria. This plan would be based upon:

(a) No Reserve call-up or legislative action.

(b) Personnel returned from Vietnam are deployable irrespective of return date.

(c) Personnel with less than 30 days to expiration of active service, or a date of deployment, are not deployable.

(d) Vietnam replacement draft (pipeline) is used as fillers.

(4) Current Personnel and Equipment Status.

(a) Personnel. No drawdowns would be required since replacement pipeline personnel are utilized.

(b) Equipment. There are no mission essential equipment shortages which cannot be resolved prior to deployment from current assets. Units will deploy with organizational equipment and five days of supplies including ammunition (units equipped with M-14 rifles). Increased obligational authority is required to reconstitute that portion of the combat stocks of the other uncommitted forces, including IV MEF, drawdown to support the deploying 5th Division units, for which combat stocks were not previously authorized.

For further discussion, see Tab B, Logistic Considerations.

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TAB A TO ANNEX C

STRATEGIC MOVEMENT CAPABILITY

1. Purpose: The purpose of this TAB is to determine under varying lift options the requirements and capabilities to transport military forces and materiel from the United States to Southeast Asia.\*

2. Assumptions:

a. That lift capabilities have been determined on the present MAC lift posture and current lift requirements. (Special airlift mission (SARD) requirements are not considered.) Deviation from either of these factors will change the closing times and require additional analyses to determine appropriate closure times.

b. That increased MAC airlift requirements in the CINCPAC area since the Pueblo incident have created a temporary aerial port backlog.

c. That the movement of the designated emergency forces will be given priority of airlift over other existing scheduled air movements.

d. That unit closure time at destination does not take into consideration possible airfield saturation.

3. Movement Scheduling: Using the options of airlift force mixes defined in paragraph 2 of Annex E, the 11 separate Marine battalions can be closed in SEA in the number of days shown by Options as follows:

	OPTIONS						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Plan Two							
Passengers 26,542	30	17	14	12	12	9	7
Bulk Cargo 17,123	31	22	21	15	12	12	11**

\* Proposed deployments of Air Force fighter and reconnaissance units are not included at this time.

\*\* Use of Option VII which includes CRAFT III does not reduce closure time for cargo because no additional outsize airlift capability is gained.

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4. Discussion: CRAF III entails the declaration of a national transportation emergency, which would tend to have a considerable disruptive effect upon the civilian economy. This is not considered feasible at this time; therefore, Option VII is deleted from further consideration other than to indicate impressive amount of lift that becomes available. The possibility of any degree of drawdown on the current level of Southeast Asia airlift support, when evaluated against the existing dangerous environment prevailing within COMUSMACV's area of responsibility, becomes remote without a thorough, detailed analysis of existing supplies and shortages and consideration of losses incurred by unexpected enemy action. For all practical purposes, without further logistic analyses in depth, this would tend to discount Option V and VI. The difference between voluntary participation at the current level by ANG/AFR and the activation of the remaining units is approximately 28 million ton miles (current level of effort - 11 million ton miles per month versus 39 million ton miles when activated). The current level of MAC commercial airlift buy engages approximately 60 percent of the airframes that would become available in the event CRAF I was invoked (Sec/Def declaration). Option III applies the significant addition of ton mile capability of the activated ANG/AFR to the task of supporting SEA at the current level. This releases lift resources which may be applied against the requirements addressed in this study.

5. Recommendations: It is recommended that Option II be implemented as the best of the two courses of action that do not activate the remainder of the ANG and AFR airlift forces. If activation of the ANG and AFR airlift forces is permitted, the best course of action is Option III. However, in the event the recent trend of special assignment airlift continues and additional supply and resupply requirements generate, it may be prudent to activate Option IV.

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TAB B TO ANNEX C

LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS (U)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this Tab is to consider the  
logistic aspects and factors incident to a deployment of a  
12/9ths Marine Corps division.

2. Assumptions

a. Additional funds required for the preparation, deployment and sustaining support will be provided as required.

b. Increased authority for accelerated procurement to include delegation of authority to the Services to negotiate noncompetitive, cost-reimbursable contracts and to provide necessary facilities and materiel will not be provided.

3. Equipment Considerations for Deploying Forces. There is no combat essential equipment shortage within the units listed as deployable which cannot be resolved prior to deployment from current assets. Units will deploy with organizational equipment and five days of combat support stock including ammunition (units armed with M-14 rifles). Additional combat support stock will be provided by a one-time surge in the established pipeline to Southeast Asia.

4. POL

a. The current petroleum inventory in I Corps is 560,000 barrels. This represents a 20-day supply to the present I Corps force. The estimated requirement for the Marine Corps battalions is 140,000 BBLS/month. The addition of this force to I Corps would reduce the days of supply in I Corps to 18 days.

b. Resupply to the new I Corps force can be sustained by tankers from the Persian Gulf and Japan.

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c. In the longer run, an additional 140,000 barrels of  
petroleum storage should be constructed in I Corps.  
Estimated cost of construction is \$1,140,000.

5. Ammunition

a. Air Munitions. No tactical aircraft will be involved;  
in this plan.

b. Ground Munitions

(1) During the 4-month period, September-December  
1967, the average tonnage expended in Southeast Asia for  
40 controlled items (about 90 to 95 percent of bulk  
monthly requirement) has been 102,000 short tons (10,000  
S/T ARVN, 92,000 S/T USARV and III MAF). Monthly pro-  
duction of ground munitions is now reaching approximately  
113,000 tons a month. From the total monthly production,  
approximately 10,000 tons per month are committed to  
essential worldwide training and a limited amount of MAP  
sales. This leaves some 103,000 tons for support of  
Southeast Asia.

(2) To support consumption generated by the Plan Two  
deployment of CONUS based Marine elements (estimate 4 Bde  
equivalents) will require an additional 9,600 S/T per  
month, an increase of 10 percent.

(3) An increase in requirements of this magnitude  
cannot be supported across the board from current pro-  
duction. A significant item basic to infantry battalion  
maneuver is the 105MM HE projectile. Current production  
of this item is at a maximum level within existing  
facilities. The procurement leadtime to acquire new  
production assets varies by item, generally from 6 to  
18 months.

(4) The deployments considered in Plan Two would be  
supported under the following conditions:

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(a) A drawdown on previously protected CONUS 1  
stocks will be necessary during procurement leadtime 2  
for new production. 3

(b) The gross requirement of 9,600 S/T would 4  
initially draw down in-country operating and safety 5  
levels until other assets could be made available. 6  
(A consequence of reduced stock availability could 7  
have an impact on the rate of combat operations) 8

(c) Certain PACOM reserve stocks have been excluded 9  
from the above considerations because of requirements 10  
associated with the Korean situation. (In view of the 11  
political and military conditions in Korea, recommenda- 12  
tions for minimal corrective actions have been for- 13  
warded to the Secretary of Defense to seek authoriza- 14  
tion to reposition ammunition in the CINCPAC area for 15  
Korea. If immediate action were authorized to reposi- 16  
tion sufficient ammunition to balance the ROK war 17  
reserves to the authorized 30-combat day level for the 18  
support of 18 ROK divisions, it would involve reposi- 19  
tioning approximately 33,000 S/T of ammunition. This 20  
would constrain any major drawdown of the PACOM 21  
reserves to offset the munitions requirements of 22  
additional forces being considered for deployment 23  
to Southeast Asia). 24

(d) The drawdown on CONUS reserves and training 25  
allocations would continue for the period of time 26  
required to fill the pipeline from new production to 27  
meet monthly consumption. 28

(5) In order to support increased consumption re- 29  
quirement, expeditious action must be taken to adjust 30

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Tab B to  
Annex C

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production schedules and facilities to provide for these  
added requirements which under Plan Two translate into  
the following (less facilities cost):

(a) 30-day consumption 9,600 S/T \$14.1 million

(Note subparagraph 5b(2))

(b) 150-day pipeline 48,000 S/T \$72 million

6. Construction

a. The deployments in Plan Two (26,000 men) can be made  
without constraint if executed on an expeditionary (field)  
basis utilizing TO&E outfitting.

b. Impact on existing facilities (without expansion) of  
sustained support of expeditionary deployment will vary in  
degree, subject to the distribution of the units in the  
ICTZ. The major constraints will be the port and LOC capa-  
city at Dong Ha (Cua Viet), Hue/Phu Bai (Tam My), and  
Duc Pho (Xa Huyuh), and to a lesser degree at Chu Lai.

c. Continued deployment of the forces in Plan Two would  
require follow-on augmentation of existing facilities, which  
would require increased civilian contractor construction or  
deployment of additional Naval Mobile Construction Battalions  
or Army Engineer Battalions.

d. The plan can be supported by initial deployment on an  
expeditionary basis, followed by construction of support  
facilities according to priority of need.

7. Other Factors. Plan Two creates lesser requirements for  
logistic support than Plan One. Nevertheless, execution of Plan  
Two would further aggravate the shortage of long procurement lead  
time items which are currently short such as helicopters, tracked  
combat vehicles, engineer equipment and ammunition. Unlike Plan  
One however, the accelerated replacement of materiel drawn down  
from other units and stocks would not be possible because of the  
lack of legislative authorization that is inherent in Plan One.

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ANNEX D

PLAN THREE

Deployment of the 82d Airborne Division to South  
Vietnam.

a. 82d Airborne Division

(1) Deployment concept. Without prior notice,  
elements of one brigade can commence movement in 24  
hours; the division itself 36-48 hours later. Deploy-  
ment would be conducted in four echelons: two brigade  
task forces followed by the division support element,  
then a brigade task force. The deployments can be  
continuous if aircraft are available.

(2) Major forces to be deployed from CONUS within  
one week:

82d Airborne Division Headquarters

Division Support Command

Three Airborne Brigades

Three Airborne Battalions each

Division Artillery

Three Field Artillery Battalions (105 mm)

One Cavalry Squadron

Total Authorized Strength 13,038

(3) Transportation Requirements. The transportation  
requirements for the move of the 82d Airborne Division  
from Fort Bragg (and staging areas) are as follows:

Personnel (Authorized strength) 13,038

Short tons of cargo 11,585

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For movement options, see Tab A, Strategic Movement Capability.

(4) Deployment Criteria and Current Major Shortages:

(a) Personnel. Division is currently short 3,074 personnel but can be filled with non-airborne personnel in 7-10 days using 30 days expiration of term of service (ETS) retainability criteria.

(b) Aviators. Division currently has shortage of 133 officer/warrant officer aviators, but these can be provided within 7-10 days after decision by using 30-days ETS retainability criteria. Replacing aviator shortages will cause severe personal hardship and curtail the provision of aviators to Korea.

(c) Aircraft. Current status:

	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On-Hand</u>	<u>Shortfall</u>
UH-1B/C	14	1	13*
UH-1D/H	35	12	23*
OH-13, OH-23, OH-6	48	0	48**

For further discussion, see Tab B, Logistic Considerations.

- \* 36 aircraft to be provided from STRAF within 7 days which has 103 of 811 UH-1s authorized. Deployability criteria may have to be waived for some aircraft.  
\*\* All OH-23s can be furnished in seven days from CONUS assets if deployability criteria is waived.

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## TAB A TO ANNEX D

STRATEGIC MOVEMENT CAPABILITY

1. Purpose: The purpose of this TAB is to determine under varying lift options the requirements and capabilities to transport military forces and materiel from the United States to Southeast Asia.\*

2. Assumptions:

a. That lift capabilities have been determined on the present MAC lift posture and current lift requirements. (Special airlift mission (SARD) requirements are not considered.) Deviation from either of these factors will change the closing times and require additional analyses to determine appropriate closure times.

b. That increased MAC airlift requirements in the CINCPAC area since the Pueblo incident have created a temporary aerial port backlog.

c. That the movement of the designated emergency forces will be given priority of airlift over other existing scheduled air movements.

d. That unit closure time at destination does not take into consideration possible airfield saturation.

3. Movement Scheduling: Using the options of airlift force mixes defined in paragraph 2 of Annex E, the 82d Airborne Division can be closed in SEA in the number of days shown by Options as follows:

	OPTIONS						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
<u>Plan Three</u>							
Passengers 13,038	15	9	8	7	5	5	4
Bulk Cargo 11,585	34	16	15	12	12	12	12**

\* Proposed deployments of Air Force fighter and reconnaissance units are not included at this time.

\*\* Use of Option VII which includes CRAF III does not reduce closure time for cargo because no additional outsize airlift capability is gained.

Tab A to  
Annex D

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4. Discussion: CRAF III entails the declaration of a national transportation emergency, which would tend to have a considerable disruptive effect upon the civilian economy. This is not considered feasible at this time; therefore, Option VII is deleted from further consideration other than to indicate impressive amount of lift that becomes available. The possibility of any degree of drawdown on the current level of Southeast Asia airlift support, when evaluated against the existing dangerous environment prevailing within COMUSMACV's area of responsibility, becomes remote without a thorough, detailed analysis of existing supplies and shortages and consideration of losses incurred by unexpected enemy action. For all practical purposes, without further logistic analyses in depth, this would tend to discount Option V and VI. The difference between voluntary participation at the current level by ANG/AFR and the activation of the remaining units is approximately 28 million ton miles (current level of effort - 11 million ton miles per month versus 39 million ton miles when activated). The current level of MAC commercial airlift buy engages approximately 60 percent of the airframes that would become available in the event CRAF I was invoked (Sec/Def declaration). Option II applies the significant addition of ton mile capability of the activated ANG/AFR to the task of supporting SEA at the current level. This releases lift resources which may be applied against the requirements addressed in this study.

5. Recommendations: It is recommended that Option II be implemented as the best of the two courses of action that do not activate the remainder of the ANG and AFR airlift forces. If activation of the ANG and AFR airlift forces is permitted, the best course of action is Option III. However, in the event the recent trend of special assignment airlift continues and additional supply and resupply requirements generate, it may be prudent to activate Option IV.

Tab A to  
Annex D

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TAB B TO ANNEX D

LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS

1. Purpose. The purpose of this Tab is to consider the logistic aspects and factors incident to a deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division.

2. Assumptions

a. Additional funds required for the preparation, deployment, and sustaining support will be provided as required.

b. Increased authority for accelerated procurement to include delegation of authority to the Services to negotiate noncompetitive, cost-reimbursable contracts and to provide necessary facilities and materiel will not be provided.

3. Equipment Considerations for Deploying Force

a. The 82nd Airborne Division can deploy logistically as a combat effective C-1 unit. To achieve C-1 readiness, however, requires the fill of shortages in the division through withdrawal of equipment from other Active and Reserve component units located in CONUS. The division has the older PRC-6 squad and platoon radios and not the newer PRT-4/PRR-9 models with which the US Army units in Vietnam are equipped. Complete quantities of the newer models could not be made available until April. Significant withdrawal of aircraft from other CONUS STRAF units would be necessary to fill shortages in the 82nd Airborne Division. The following is the aircraft status of the division:

	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On-Hand</u>	<u>Shortfall</u>
UH-1B/C	14	1	13
UH-1D/H	35	12	23
OH-13, OH-23, OH-6	48	0	48

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b. In order to complete the fill of UH-1s, 36 would have to be withdrawn from STRAF which has on hand 103 of 811 UH-1s authorized. The required UH-1s could be transferred from present CONUS locations and be on station at Fort Bragg within seven days after decision. Deployability criteria may have to be waived for some aircraft.

c. There are 45 OH-23G helicopters in CONUS; 16 of these are in the training base. It is estimated that 10 percent of the total OH-23s would meet deployment criteria. All of the OH-23s could be furnished within seven days.

#### 4. POL

a. The current petroleum inventory in I Corps is 560,000 barrels. This represents a 20-day supply to the present I Corps force. The estimated requirement for the 82nd Airborne Division is 70,000 BBLS/month. The addition of this force to I Corps would reduce the days of supply in I Corps to 19 days.

b. Resupply to the new I Corps force can be sustained by tankers from the Persian Gulf and Japan.

c. In the longer run, an additional 70,000 barrels of petroleum storage should be constructed in I Corps. Estimated cost of construction is \$700,000.

#### 5. Ammunition

a. Air Munitions. With the normal quantity of gun ships authorized, the requirement for rockets should present no air munitions requirement problems.

##### b. Ground Munitions

(1) During the 4-month period, September-December 1967, the average tonnage expended in Southeast Asia for 40 controlled items (about 90 to 95 percent of bulk monthly requirement) has been 102,000 short tons (10,000 S/T ARVN, 92,00 S/T USARV and III MAF). Monthly production of ground munitions is now reaching approximately

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113,000 tons a month. From the total monthly production, 1  
approximately 10,000 tons per month are committed to 2  
essential worldwide training and a limited amount of MAP 3  
sales. This leaves some 103,000 tons for support of 4  
Southeast Asia. 5

(2) To support consumption generated by the Plan Three, 6  
deployment of one airborne division will require an 7  
additional 7,200 S/T per month, an increase of 8 percent. 8

(3) An increase in requirements of this magnitude 9  
cannot be supported across the board from current pro- 10  
duction. A significant item basic to infantry battalion 11  
maneuver is the 105MM HE projectile. Current production 12  
of this item is at a maximum level within existing 13  
facilities. The procurement leadtime to acquire new 14  
production assets varies by item, generally from 6 to 15  
18 months. 16

(4) The deployments considered in Plan Three can be 17  
supported under the following conditions: 18

(a) A drawdown on previously protected CONUS stocks 19  
will be necessary during procurement leadtime for new 20  
production. 21

(b) The gross requirement of 7,200 S/T would 22  
initially draw down in-country operating and safety 23  
levels until other assets could be made available. 24  
(A consequence of reduced stock availability could 25  
have an impact on the rate of combat operations). 26

(c) Certain PACOM reserve stocks have been 27  
excluded from the above considerations because of 28  
requirements associated with the Korean situation. 29  
(In view of the political and military conditions in 30  
Korea, recommendations for minimal corrective actions 31

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have been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense to seek  
authorization to reposition ammunition in the CINCPAC  
area for Korea. If immediate action were authorized to  
reposition sufficient ammunition to balance the ROK war  
reserves to the authorized 30-combat day level for the  
support of 18 ROK divisions, it would involve reposi-  
tioning approximately 33,000 S/T of ammunition. This  
would constrain any major drawdown on the PACOM reserve  
to offset the munitions requirements of additional  
forces being considered for deployment to Southeast  
Asia).

(d) The drawdown on CONUS reserves and training  
allocations would continue for the period of time  
required to fill the pipeline from new production to  
meet monthly consumption.

(5) In order to support increased consumption require-  
ments expeditious action must be taken to adjust pro-  
duction schedules and facilities to provide for these  
added requirements which under Plan Three translate into  
the following (less facilities cost).

(a) 30-day consumption 7,200 S/T \$10.8 million

(Note subparagraph 5b(2)above)

(b) 150-day pipeline 36,000 S/T 54 million

#### 6. Construction

a. The deployments in Plan Three (13,000 men) can be made  
without constraint if executed on an expeditionary (field)  
basis utilizing TO&E outfitting.

b. Impact on existing facilities (without expansion) of  
sustained support of expeditionary deployment will vary in  
degree, subject to the distribution of the units in the ICTZ.  
The major constraints will be the port and LOC capacity at  
Dong Ha (Cua Viet), Hue/Phu Bai (Tam My), and Duc Pho (Xa  
Huyuh), and to a lesser degree at Chu Lai.

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c. Continued deployment of the forces in Plan Three would  
require follow-on augmentation of existing facilities, which  
would require increased civilian contractor construction or  
deployment of additional Naval Mobile Construction Battalions  
or Army Engineer Battalions.

d. The plan can be supported by initial deployment on  
an expeditionary basis, followed by construction of support  
facilities according to priority of need.

7. Other Factors. Plan Three creates lesser requirements for  
logistic support than Plan One. Nevertheless, execution of Plan  
Three would further aggravate the shortage of long procurement  
lead time items which are currently short such as helicopters,  
tracked combat vehicles, engineer equipment and ammunition.  
Unlike Plan One however, the accelerated replacement of materiel  
drawn down from other units and stocks would not be possible  
because of lack of legislative authorization that is inherent in  
Plan One.

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